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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jerry E. Vavold appeals from the summary dismissal of his untimely 
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts, as a matter of first impression, that 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given 
retroactive application. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Vavold's conviction and sentence for 
lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen on October 27, 2000. State v. 
Vavold, 2000 Unpublished Opinion No. 696, Docket No. 26129 (Idaho App., 
October 27, 2000). Over seven years later, on November 26, 2007, Vavold filed 
a petition for post-conviction relief under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"). (R., pp. 3-9.) The factual basis for his petition was 
Vavold's claim that he was not "allowed councel [sic] at the [sexual abuse] 
evaluation." (R., p. 8.) 
The state moved for summary disposition on two bases: that the petition 
was untimely and that it failed to factually support a cognizable claim upon which 
post-conviction relief could be granted. (R., pp. 10-17.) Vavold, through counsel, 
responded to the state's motion. (R., pp. 21-26.) Included with the response 
were court minutes from the underlying criminal case, showing that a sexual 
abuse evaluation was ordered for sentencing, and a new affidavit by Vavold, 
asserting that a sexual history was part of that evaluation and that the evaluation 
was submitted to the court by Vavold's counsel. (R., pp. 27-30.) Vavold also 
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requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the "records, file and pleadings" 
of the underlying criminal case. (R., p. 32.) The district court did so except as to 
the PSI and the evaluation itself. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 17-22; p. 14, L. 12-p. 15, L. 1.) 
After a hearing at which it took argument (R., p. 34; see generally, Tr.), the 
district court granted the state's motion (R., pp. 35-48). Although the district 
court specifically recognized that the state was also requesting summary 
disposition for inadequate factual allegations (R., p. 38), it did not address this 
issue after finding that the petition was untimely (R., pp. 38-47; Tr., p. 15, Ls. 2-
8). Vavold filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 51-53.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Vavold states the issue on appeal as: 
The issue before this Court is whether Estrada announced a 
new rule of law when it held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attached to a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation[.] 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Vavold failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
Vavold's petition, filed about seven years after resolution of the appeal in the 




Vavold's Petition Was Not Filed Within The One-Year Time Limit Mandated By 
The UPCPA 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Vavold's untimely petition for post-conviction 
relief. Although Vavold never mentions the statutory basis for dismissal, he 
apparently argues that he should be excused from the UPCPA's one-year 
limitation period for filing a petition because the holding of Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given retroactive application. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Vavold's argument is without merit for three 
reasons. First, there is no "retroactivity" exception to the one-year filing deadline 
of I.C. § 19-4902(a). Second, even if there were such an exception, the holding 
of Estrada meets no test for retroactive application. Finally, even if Estrada had 
announced a new rule meriting retroactive application Vavold would not be 
entitled to pursue his untimely petition because it does not set forth a prirna facie 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the rubric of Estrada. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The application of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of 
facts is a question of law subject to free review on appeal. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,206,984 P.2d 
128, 129 (Ct App. 1999). 
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C. The UPCPA Does Not Include A "Retroactivity" Exception To Its One-Year 
Filing Requirement 
A proceeding under the UPCPA "may be filed at any time within one (1) 
year ... from the determination of an appeal .... " !.C. § 19-4902(a). Absent a 
showing by the petitioner that the one-year statute of limitation should be tolled, 
the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal 
of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas 
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Vavold has presented no claim that the limitation period of I.C. § 19-
4902(a) should be tolled. On the contrary, he has claimed that the issuance of 
an opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court should be given retroactive application 
and that this justifies dispensing with the UPCPA limitation period. He has cited 
no Idaho case holding that retroactive application of a case is grounds for filing a 
post-conviction petition outside of the one-year limitation period of the UPCPA. 
(See generally, Appellant's brief.) 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. Id. Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). 
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The language of t.C. § 19-4902(a) is plain: a petition must be brought 
"within one (1) year ... from the determination of an appeal" of the underlying 
criminal case. The statute contains no provision exempting claims based on 
some new authority or legal rule. Vavold has cited to no authority holding that he 
is entitled by constitution or statute to collaterally attack his conviction or 
sentence in Idaho courts beyond the bounds set by the Idaho Legislature. The 
plain language of the statute does not include any "retroactivity" exception for 
collateral attacks on a conviction under the UPCPA, and therefore Vavold has 
failed to show error in the dismissal of his untimely petition.1 
D. The Holding Of Estrada Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For 
Retroactive Application 
A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States must be given 
retroactive effect to cases pending on direct review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 
139, 141 n.1, 176 P.3d 911,913 n.1 (2007) (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep't of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). But filill State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 517, 
181 P.3d 440, 443 (2008) (case law overruling precedent upon which a 
defendant relied may not be given retroactive effect to defendant's detriment) 
1 Moreover, even if there were a "retroactivity" exception, it would not apply to 
Vavold. The Supreme Court of Idaho decided Estrada on November 24, 2006. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Vavold filed his petition 
more than a year later, on November 26, 2007. (R., p. 3.) Even if Vavold were 
entitled to the benefit of the "mailbox rule," he sent his petition on November 21, 
2007. (R., p. 7.) Mailing his petition 362 days after Estrada was decided was not 
within a "reasonable time." See Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 
870 (2007) (successive petitions must be filed within reasonable time of learning 
facts underlying new claims). Although ii does not appear that Vavold's petition 
is successive, the "reasonable time" standard is appropriate to avoid multiple 
standards for when petitions based on "new rules" must be filed. 
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(citing State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609, 611, 97 P.3d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 2004)). 
Decisions of the Supreme Court generally need not, however, be given 
retroactive effect on a collateral challenge to a conviction. See, M.,, Hoffman v. 
State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 P.3d 958, 960 (2005) (decision requiring jury 
determination of defendant's eligibility for death penalty not given retroactive 
application to cases not on direct review); Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 438, 
914 P.2d 933, 935 (1996) (stating, in dicta, that new decision of Idaho Supreme 
Court would not apply retroactively in collateral challenge to sentence). Instead, 
the holding of a case will be given retroactive application in collateral challenges 
to a judgment only if the holding of the case represents a "new rule" that 
"'requires observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 
In Re: Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 476, 903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. 
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) 
(plurality opinion)).2 The holding in Estrada, however, is. neither a "new rule" nor 
one that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
1. Estrada Did Not Create A "New Rule" 
The holding in Estrada was not a "new rule." A "new rule" is one not 
dictated by existing precedent and that was susceptible to reasonable debate at 
the time judgment was rendered. Gafford, 127 Idaho at 476 n.1, 903 P.2d at 65 
n.1 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). The holdings of the 
2 The adoption of the Teague standard in In re: Gafford (albeit arguably in dicta) 
seems to belie the assertion that Idaho courts follow a different retroactivity 
standard than the Supreme Court of the United States. Vavold cites no case 
more recent than 1982 for the proposition that Idaho may employ a different 
standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19.) 
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Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada were, by the Court's own reasoning, dictated by 
precedent and not susceptible to debate; therefore, the holdings do not constitute 
any "new rule." 
Estrada was convicted of rape and ordered by the district court to undergo 
a psychosexual evaluation. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 560, 149 P.3d 833, 
835 (2006). Estrada initially did not want to participate in the evaluation, but did 
after being advised to do so by his counsel. & Estrada claimed in post-
conviction proceedings that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him 
that his privilege against compelled self-incrimination extended to participation in 
the psychosexual evaluation. & The district court agreed that counsel's failure 
to so advise Estrada was deficient performance, but held that Estrada had failed 
to establish prejudice. Id. at 560-61, 149 P.3d at 835-36. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that there was no clear law that a 
defendant could invoke his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse 
participation in a sentencing evaluation, and therefore his counsel's performance 
was not deficient in failing to so advise Estrada. & at 561, 149 P.3d at 836. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. In so doing, the 
Court first held that the Sixth Amendment applied to Estrada's claim, but noted its 
holding was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual 
exam." & at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (emphasis added). The Court then 
addressed whether counsel's performance had been deficient, and stated "[t]his 
Court's decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, 
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for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination applies." ]Q,_ at 563, 149 P.3d at 838. Finally, 
the court found prejudice. ]Q,_ at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. 
That the Estrada Court itself felt it was applying an "old rule" instead of a 
"new rule" is apparent from the Estrada decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
had specifically held that it was declaring a "new rule" under the Fifth 
Amendment, which was the basis of its holding that Estrada's counsel could not 
be held to have performed deficiently. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, 
however, concluding that the law was sufficiently well established to have 
required Estrada's trial counsel to have advised him of his right against 
compulsory self-incrimination in relation to the psychosexual evaluation. 
Vavold argues that Estrada enunciates a "new rule" under the Sixth 
Amendment because it was not clear that the right to counsel's advice in relation 
to a psychological evaluation had not been clearly applied in non-capital cases. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-16.) There are two flaws in this argument. First, Vavold 
has cited to no authority extant at the time that Estrada was decided that even 
suggests that counsel would not be considered ineffective for giving erroneous 
legal advice in relation to pre-sentencing evaluations. That the state never 
argued in Estrada that the Sixth Amendment did not apply, Estrada, 143 Idaho at 
561, 149 P.3d at 836 ("neither party" raised issue of applicability of Sixth 
Amendment), indicates that there was no ground for "reasonable debate" on this 
issue when Estrada was decided. 
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The second flaw in this argument is that the Estrada Court clearly thought 
the rule well enough established to conclude that counsel should have known of 
his duty to advise his client. "Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies 
both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to 
cases that are still on direct review." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _, 
127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007). Estrada was seeking collateral review: if the Idaho 
Supreme Court had concluded it was applying a "new rule," then Estrada himself 
would have been unable to take advantage of the "new rule," and the Supreme 
Court would have affirmed the lower courts. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also rejected an argument 
almost identical to that made by Vavold in this case. In Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 
211 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that precedent of the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307(1985)) did 
not apply retroactively. Aiken, 484 U.S. at 213. The South Carolina Attorney 
General argued this was so because the Francis case was a "new rule" that was 
not otherwise retroactively applicable. Id. at 215. The Court rejected this 
argument, concluding that in the controlling case (Francis) the Court had merely 
applied the rule announced in a prior case, and had stated in Francis that it was 
so doing. lf!., at 215-17. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada at least implicitly concluded it was 
not applying a "new rule." It certainly rejected the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning that Estrada was not entitled to relief because the Fifth Amendment 
rule it was applying was "new." If the rule in Estrada was in fact new (but failed 
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to otherwise qualify for retroactive application) it would not have applied to 
Estrada himself, or to any other defendant whose direct review was completed 
prior to issuance of the Estrada opinion. Vavold has failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating that the Sixth Amendment rule in question was "new." 
2. Even If The Rule Announced In Estrada Were New. It Was Not 
"Watershed" 
Vavold has fajled to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if it 
were "new," meets the legal standards for retroactive application. As stated 
above, even a "new rule" is not retroactively applied unless it "'requires the 
observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' In Re: 
Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality 
opinion)). A "new rule" does not meet this standard unless it is a "watershed rule 
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 
1181 (2007) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). "This exception 
is extremely narrow." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme 
Court has "observed that it is unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge." 
lg_, (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). The Court has also, in 
every case since Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), rejected every claim that 
a new rule should be applied retroactively. Id. at 1181-82 (see cases cited). The 
"new rule" articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding 
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confront declarant), did not qualify as "watershed." Bockting, 549 U.S. at _, 
127 at 1182-84. 
Vavold has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if new, 
was "watershed." 
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two 
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an 
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the 
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. at_, 127 at 1182 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Application of this standard shows that Estrada's rule is not "watershed." 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed application of the 
retroactivity standard to new sentencing rules in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 
348 (2004), where the Court decided that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 
(holding that statutory aggravators that make a defendant eligible for the death 
penalty must be decided by a jury), is not subject to retroactive application. 
The Court first noted the applicable standard for the first part of the two-
part test set forth above, then stated, "That a new procedural rule is 
'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one without 
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Schriro, 
542 U.S. at 352 (emphasis original, quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Thus, in that case "the question is whether judicial factfinding so seriously 
diminishes accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing 
conduct the law does not reach." kt. at 355-56 (emphasis original, quotation 
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court stated it was "implausible that 
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judicial factfinding so seriously diminishes accuracy as to produce an 
impermissibly large risk of injustice." j_g_.,_ at 356 (emphasis original, quotation 
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Thus, the Ring rule was not "watershed." 
j_g_.,_ 
Here Vavold has not established that sentencing under the rubric of law 
prior to Estrada "seriously diminishes" the accuracy of factfinding in sentencing 
such there was an "impermissibly large risk of injustice." There is no indication 
that a significant number of defendants will chose to exercise their Fifth 
Amendment rights and forgo an evaluation. Those who choose to participate in 
the evaluation are in the same position as all defendants pre-Estrada, and are 
not at greater risk of injustice than those who refuse the evaluation. In addition, 
depriving the sentencing court of an evaluation seems more calculated to making 
factfinding regarding rehabilitation potential less accurate, rather than more 
accurate; indeed, it seems apparent that most defendants who exercise their 
rights and refuse an evaluation out of fear of incrimination will do so with the 
hope that factfinding at sentencing will be less accurate. In short, while trials, 
sentencings and other court proceedings cannot be counted on to be accurate if 
a defendant is entirely deprived of all rights to counsel, the rule that counsel have 
an obligation to accurately describe to their clients their right to refuse a 
sentencing evaluation is not a rule that seriously enhances the accuracy of 
sentencing. 
Likewise, having counsel's advice on the right to remain silent for a 
psychosexual evaluation does not "alter our understanding of the bedrock 
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procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Indeed, having 
that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision whether to 
participate in an evaluation because he believes participation will ultimately help 
at sentencing, or decline to participate because he believes participation will be 
incriminating in the sense that it would lead to a longer sentence. An evaluation 
itself is not constitutionally required; whether a defendant invokes his right to 
silence and participates in the evaluation or instead elects to not participate is 
simply not a bedrock procedural element essential to a fair sentencing. 
Vavold does not even try to apply this standard in his case. On the 
contrary, he argues that any new rule expanding the right to effective assistance 
of counsel in any way is watershed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17 (citing Howard 
v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1078 (11 th Cir. 2004).) 
The flaw in this argument is that in Howard and the cases it cites, the 
issue was denial of counsel, not merely whether the defendant had the effective 
assistance of counsel. See Howard, 374 F.3d at 1077-81 {applying Alabama v. 
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), retroactively to hold that an uncounseled guilty 
plea may not be used as a prior conviction for enhancement). In Estrada there 
was no claim that Estrada was denied counsel; his only claim was that his 
counsel had acted ineffectively when he encouraged Estrada to participate in the 
evaluation without informing him that he had a right to not participate. Estrada, 
143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (Estrada's right articulated as right to 
advice, not presence). There is a fundamental difference between the absolute 
denial of counsel and a holding that counsel was constitutionally required to give 
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accurate advice on legal rights that might have been asserted in relation to an 
ordered psychological evaluation. 
In Estrada the Idaho Supreme Court applied the holding of Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981 ), in the context of a non-capital case, stating that it 
would "make no sense" to afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel at the 
guilty plea hearing and sentencing but then hold that he was not "entitled to the 
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation." 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562. Vavold has failed to show how this ruling is 
"watershed," as that term is defined in the law. 
E. Even If Estrada Were Retroactively Applicable. Vavold Did Not State A 
Cognizable Claim Under Estrada 
The Estrada court limited its holding of a right to counsel to "the finding 
that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding only the 
I 
decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual exam," distinguishing the 
right to "assistance of counsel" from the right to "presence of counsel." Estrada, 
143 Idaho at 562-63 (bolding added, italics original). Thus, the Court recognized 
only a right to have counsel correctly advise the defendant of the right to silence 
so that the defendant can elect whether to participate in the evaluation; it did not 
recognize a right to the presence of counsel during the evaluation or to object to 
bits and pieces of the evaluation. 
Vavold did not assert a claim cognizable under Estrada. On the contrary, 
it is clear that Vavold asserted a right to have counsel present and to object to 
only certain parts of the evaluation - a right never recognized in Estrada. 
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Vavold set forth his claim as "failure to have counsel at a criticle [sic] stage 
in the evaluation - denied Vth [sic] Amend. rights." (R., p. 5.) His initial affidavit 
in support of his claim states that he "was never allowed councel [sic] at the 
evaluation" and that he "requested an attorney, but was told the court ordered it." 
(R., p. 8.) After being given counsel in post-conviction, Vavold filed an affidavit 
stating that the evaluator assigned by the court could not complete the evaluation 
in time for sentencing, so Vavold "then obtained an evaluation from another 
psychologist, Dr. Jerry Doke, to comply with the court's order." (R., p. 30.) The 
affidavit then alleges, "My attorney submitted that evaluation to the court." (R., p. 
30.) Vavold also states that, to the best of his recollection, the evaluation 
included "details of my sexual history and [that history] was used to reach 
conclusions in the evaluation." (R., p. 30.) 
Vavold never asserted that his counsel did not advise him of his right to 
refuse to participate in the evaluation. Rather, he asserted that he was denied 
the presence of counsel at the evaluation itself. Further, Vavold did not allege 
that, if informed of his right, he would not have undergone the evaluation. (R., 
pp. 8, 29-30.) His complaints instead center on one aspect of the evaluation -
the sexual history - as the part of the evaluation he would not have participated 
in. (R., p. 30.) 
Estrada did not recognize a right to presence of counsel to object to 
limited parts of an evaluation as Vavold stated as his cause of action. Because 
Vavold did not state a cause of action cognizable under Estrada, he has failed to 
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show error in the summary dismissal of his claim even if Estrada were to be 
given retroactive effect. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Vavold's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 8th day of January 20 9. 
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